OK But What If Iran Remained a Democracy?

Written by: Ismoil Abrakhmatov

Edited by: Samyukta Vivek

On August 19th, 1953, the United States’ Central Intelligence Agency and the United Kingdom’s Secret Intelligence Service overthrew Iranian prime minister Mohammad Mossadegh in a coup, for his nationalist and anti-Western views. In an underrated statement Mossadegh made after the American-backed Shah sentenced him to three years of solitary confinement, he sarcastically remarked, “Truely tonight the Iranian nation understood the meaning of constitutionalism.”

But, what might have happened, had Iran’s very development as a country not been disrupted by outside meddling, and Mossadegh stayed and left peacefully instead of violently? What might have happened had there not been an authoritarian regime so despicable afterwards, that radical Islamists could gain enough support to destroy and eschew democratic ideals entirely?

Firstly, a larger historical context is necessary. Mossadegh was elected prime minister on April 28th, 1951, in a 79 to 12 vote by the Majilis, the country’s parliament. Ultimately, the reason he was successfully appointed was his promise on nationalizing the country’s oil away from the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, and away from the U.K. as a whole. This particular issue deeply triggered Iranians, as the British maintained quasi-imperial control over Iran, and less than 16 percent of the prosperous Anglo-Iranian Oil Company’s profits were actually heading back to its own country. Thus, the biased deals were scrapped with Britain, and the empire did not take this lightly. Since World War 2, Britain was surrendering to countless anticolonial movements across the world, and it was definitely not about to lose large swaths of lucrative oil fields in such a strategic region like the Middle East. But at last, even the United States, a long-time ally of the British, refused to coerce Iran into reversing their policies. In the end, after Iranian officials discovered the development of a British coup plot, Mossadegh cut off all diplomacy

Then, in 1952, the United States held their presidential elections. Eisenhower won, and was all in favor of replacing Iran’s government. After all, Mossadegh had erased all opportunities for oil negotiations with any foreign entity, and the neighboring Soviets started to look dangerous with their sympathy for the nation’s communist Tudeh party. In direct response to these hostilities, the U.S. and the U.K.’s intelligence agencies CIA and MI6 respectively, executed Operation Ajax, in which they would fuel artificial dissent against Mossadegh through bribing journalists, politicians, and other internal figures to cry corruption and tyranny against Mossadegh. Back then, as the prime minister attempted to navigate these developments, he himself began using emergency autocratic powers to desperately maintain stability. Most notably, these included posting a rigged referendum to measure government popularity, ending with Mossadegh winning 99.4% “support”. But this only catalyzed more protests. Finally, it was the combination of targeted espionage and the resulting blunders that kicked Mossadegh out and placed Fazlollah Zahedi as the new prime minister.

Intriguingly however, Zahedi was never the chosen figure to rule Iran. Prior to Ajax, existing monarch Mohammad Reza Pahlavi Shah secretly discussed with American officials on how he would consolidate his own power—from a ceremonial position to one of authority. After much financial bribery and talks about the distribution of Iran’s oil revenue, he agreed to seize absolute control. Later on, the Shah deemed that Zahedi was becoming too powerful, and in a decisive power struggle, pushed him out of power to work as an ambassador instead. And it’s at this point when Mossadegh is charged with treason and sentenced for three years of solitary confinement, before being left under house arrest for the rest of his life—until he died of stomach ulcers on March 5th, 1967.

What happened beyond the 1950s is now axiomatic. The Shah’s legitimacy, being grounded on divine labels like the “Light of the Aryans” rather than merit, forced him to use his violent secret police to keep public dissent at bay: sometimes torturing political opponents to stop them from fighting further. Inevitably, he failed in many social and economic policies because of his brainless role as a yes-man for Anglo-American motives. It was also his policy of harsh societal secularism in particular, that riled up the radical Islamist faction of the nation: the same ones who would then swiftly take the country in the aftermath of the 1979 revolution. From then on, Iran welded itself into a theocratic state based on obedience and fear of the government, and its powerful clerical figures have utilized historical Western exploitation to discredit the political opposition—to mark themselves as the saviors of Iran.

So there’s all the history, but what about the possibility? From the start, the U.S. was not too keen on internally dismantling Iran to become a Western puppet, and only through suspicions of communism and weakened state capacity did it agree to take out Mossadegh. It’s not unreasonable to assume that had circumstances been slightly different, there would not have been a plot to overthrow Iran’s prime minister and swerve Iran’s future into such a terrible direction.

Firstly, if Operation Ajax doesn’t happen, we can expect a more democratic and politically liberalized Iran. For one, Mossadegh was a very progressive individual who believed in the power of a democracy. He explicitly believed in weakening unelected institutions like the royal court, in ensuring coercion was rarely used to enforce laws, and most famously, in securing national self-determination and economic sovereignty. If Mossadegh remained in power, it is almost certain that Iran would’ve made great leaps towards the democracies found in western Europe. Mossadegh literally studied politics at a university in Paris, and was the first Iranian to earn a PhD in law at a European institution. Why would he not be familiar with democratic values? Of course, there are always outside factors to consider before making these optimistic inferences: the growing support for Iran’s communist faction is a large one. Still, if Mossadegh had left a larger impact on Iran’s regime for a longer period of time, and had transitioned out in a stable manner, the nation could have avoided strong public ire at the government’s repressive measures against religion: a key reason radical Islamists revolted in 1979. Furthermore, even if Iran may remain nationalist and isolated in the short term, this liberalism could prove Iran a reliable ally for the West in future Middle Eastern politics. Simply put, the U.S. and the U.K. were too honed in on oil revenue and fighting communism, that they failed to consider what breaking down a democracy actually meant.

Second, Iran would be more economically developed. After the overthrow of Mossadegh, Iran became an oil state, consistently reliant on acute Western demands that prevented the country from diversifying its economy or developing domestic infrastructure. This curse dragged out into the Islamic Republic as well, accumulating into a massive trade deficit with no easy way out. Considering that Mossadegh was building rural banks, setting up factories and mills, and generally improving Iran’s trade balance, an Iran without Operation Ajax would have vastly expanded economic opportunities. Mossadegh and the prime ministers that may follow, would have ensured Iranians are not angry at government inefficiency and kept a stable regime in place. Moreover, there is the obvious benefit with this outcome—that less people would suffer. Most rural groups in Iran lack easy access to basic goods, while dealing with rampant inflation and little to no social infrastructure. With a government structure that appoints major figures by technical skills over adherence to the state’s clergy, such a widespread struggle would be entirely diminished, and Iranians could develop just like how other Westerners in the world were able to.

I will leave the speculation at this. Obviously, there are many more implications that have gone unexplored. However, generally speaking, we can conclude that the state of the world—especially Iran—would be in a much better position both economically and socially…. In the timeline where Mossadegh remains, maybe 93 million people would not have to live under a vengeful and repressive regime that constantly reminds its people of Western oppression to justify their rule. Maybe international economies would not need to worry over whether the Strait of Hormuz will close and raise basic living costs for everyone. Even to this day, when the United States and the United Kingdom are praised as the inspiring models of democracy, these countries are childishly reluctant to admit it is their fault a fellow democracy was dismantled. It is because of their imperial ambitions 73 years ago, that thousands of innocent Iranians now get imprisoned or executed every year.

There are many terrible outcomes in history that were hard to detect or avoid. But Operation Ajax is not one of them. Imagine a British victory over the colonies in the American Revolution, and that is exactly what Iran faced. Imagine a German victory over Britain in the second World War, and that is exactly what Iran faced. These countries like to speak of themselves as the “leaders of the free world,” but decisions like Ajax all but exemplify how these messages may only be repeated for convenience, not genuine respect. Perhaps in a world where the United States did not blindly retaliate against the slightest hints of communism around the world, would things turn out favorable for Iran. Perhaps then, would the Iranian nation understand the meaning of constitutionalism.

Works Cited

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Hangen, Welles. “Mossadegh Gets 3-Year Jail Term.” The New York Times, 22 December 1953, https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/library/world/mideast/122253iran-jail.html. Accessed 15 October 2026.

“Iran celebrates 65th anniversary of oil nationalization.” Islamic Republic News Agency, 19 March 2016, https://en.irna.ir/news/82007325/Iran-celebrates-65th-anniversary-of-oil-nationalization. Accessed 15 October 2026.

Kia, Shahriar. “Revisiting the Legacy of Mohammad Mossadegh: A Blueprint for Democratic Governance in Iran.” National Council of Resistance of Iran, 30 July 2025, https://www.ncr-iran.org/en/news/iran-resistance/revisiting-the-legacy-of-mohammad-mossadegh-a-blueprint-for-democratic-governance/. Accessed 15 October 2025.

“Mohammad Mossadegh | History | Research Starters.” EBSCO, https://www.ebsco.com/research-starters/history/mohammad-mossadegh/. Accessed 15 October 2026.

“Support for the Overthrow of Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddeq - The 10 Best and 10 Worst U.S. Foreign Policy Decisions - The 10 Best and 10 Worst U.S. Foreign Policy Decisions.” Council on Foreign Relations, https://www.cfr.org/ten-best-ten-worst-us-foreign-policy-decisions/support-for-the-overthrow-of-iranian-prime-minister-mohammad-mosaddegh/. Accessed 15 October 2026.